# Weber AH—Val RR R5 vs. KCKCC CG

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#### Indefinite Detention means detaining an arrested person without a trial

US LEGAL 13 [US Legal Forms Inc., Indefinite Detention Law and Legal Definition http://definitions.uslegal.com/i/indefinite-detention/]

Indefinite detention is the practice of detaining an arrested person by a national government or law enforcement agency without a trial. It may be made by the home country or by a foreign nation. Indefinite detention is a controversial practice, especially in situations where the detention is by a foreign nation. It is controversial because it seems to violate many national and international laws. It also violates human rights laws. Indefinite detention is seen mainly in cases of suspected terrorists who are indefinitely detained.The Law Lords, Britain’s highest court, have held that the indefinite detention of foreign terrorism suspects is incompatible with the Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Human Rights. [Human Rights Watch] In the U.S., indefinite detention has been used to hold terror suspects. The case relating to the indefinite detention of Jose Padilla is one of the most highly publicized cases of indefinite detention in the U.S. In the U.S., indefinite detention is a highly controversial matter and is currently under review. Organizations such as International Red Cross and FIDH are of the opinion that U.S. detention of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay is not based on legal grounds. However, the American Civil Liberties Union is of the view that indefinite detention is permitted pursuant to section 412 of the USA Patriot Act.

#### Defending the topic as written is key—their failure to do so prevents effective democratic deliberation **by precluding debate over controversial issues—the non-falsifiability of their position destroys profitable argumentation**

Steinberg and Freeley, 8
(David L Steinberg is a professor of communication studies – University of Miami, and Austin J Freeley is a criminal, civil rights law, and personal injury attorney., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pg.3-4 ) MT

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a fact or value or policy, there is no need for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate “Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this statement. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms.” That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as “We ought to do something about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with.” Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements “Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program” more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about “homelessness” or “abortion” or “crime” or “global warming” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does “effectiveness” mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### And, democratic deliberation is the cornerstone of solving all existential global problems**Lundberg 10** [Christian O. Lundberg, Professor of Communications at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311, Ssanchez]The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. **But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech**—as indicated earlier**, debate builds capacity for critical thinking**, analysis of public claims, **informed decision making, and better public judgment**. **If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid** scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, **and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue thatthese conditions warrant giving up on debate**. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because **as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy** such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems **place such a high premium on education** (Dewey 1988,63, 154). **Debate** provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it **builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them**, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. T**he merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy**. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim **that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity**. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively**, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice** in the classroom as a **technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities**. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, **and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement andnew articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including**: domestic and international **issues of class, gender, and racial justice**; wholesale **environmental destruction** and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of **terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization** including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, **an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill** and sensitivity **provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges** to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### **And, absent political simulations we become passive spectators in the world—switch side is key**

Joyner 1999 – Christopher C Joyner Professor of International Law in the Government Department at Georgetown University Spring, 1999 5 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 377 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law

Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. n8 The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.

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#### The prioritization of discussions on human-centered oppression naturalizes a dualism between the human and nonhuman, justifying endless consumption of nature

Rose ‘06 (Rebecca, Lecturer in Literature for Trinity College Foundation Studies, The University of Melbourne, “COLLOQUY text theory critique”, <http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/colloquy/download/colloquy_issue_12_november_2006/issue12.pdf>, AO)

Arguing that nonhumans are inherently valuable, that is, nonhumans have rights independent of human interest or human resemblance, is met with general resistance, which is exceedingly powerful when coming from a dominant modern culture. Consumption by humans is a core tenet of this dominant modern culture. Recognising the inherent value and rights of nonhumans leads to recognising the necessary responsibility and care of humans towards nonhumans, and threatens the ideal, or rather the ideology, of unconditional consumption, because it is nonhumans who are being consumed excessively and without respect.15 That a foremost cause of humans violating other humans’ rights follows directly from this culture supporting a slight minority of humans who consume excessively and indifferently at the expense of all others, is an established criticism that I will not address directly.16 For now, I am skeptical of any reasoning which suggests that showing care towards nonhumans compromises human wellbeing. If at all, it is the human-centric theories for admitting nonhumans into ethical consideration that are likely to be accepted within the dominating modern culture. Even then, such acceptance of an ethical code is irregularly or improperly conducted into practice. As for valuing nonhumans for their inherent selves – this possible social development is at the farthest peripheries of theoretical ethical consideration, let alone being a code evident in practice within the human-nonhuman relationship typical of the dominant culture. An argument for human rights may be drawn by examining the foundations of present human rights work. A fundamental cause of the failure of human rights work to achieve an enduring and positive difference can be identified in its underlying reasoning. It seems sound: strengthen human rights by targeting those who appear to violate them. Nearly all human rights work is based upon bettering the human-human relationship. The ideal human-human relationship, the kind envisioned by the Universal Declaration, has been established as the theoretical foundation of world peace. By implication we perceive real human-human relationship as the basic problem. Supposedly, if we fix the way humans treat each other, then the ░ Human Rights 143 world’s problems will disappear. I partly agree. Without doubt, human beings are today an unprecedented and fierce force. The immediate future of earthly life does appear to be dependent upon what we humans do. However, I would disagree that what we humans do to each other is the essential determinant of peace. I am not sure, in other words, that the mistreatment of humans by humans is the foremost problem. The centralization of human-human relationships continues into the burgeoning work for nonhuman rights, which is largely developing as secondary to human rights: either as a reinforcement or extension of human rights. It is significant that work for nonhuman rights follows on from work for human rights. The ideal human-human relationship is constructed as a pre-existent, or a priori ethical ideal for the human-nonhuman relationship. Taking human rights as the foundation for nonhuman rights misdirects ethical development. Although I might proceed by bringing nonhuman rights solely into the foreground, my specific intention here is to develop human rights. Orientating discussion towards the development of human rights specifically does not undermine my belief that human and nonhuman rights cannot be treated as exclusive subjects or forked ethical paths. Continual and inevitable recourse to the subject of nonhuman rights will attest this. My rejection of human-centric ethical development is not driven entirely by the failure of human-centrism to really recognise nonhuman rights. Taking human rights as the foundation for nonhuman rights misdirects ethical theory and practice to the detriment of nonhumans and humans. The rest of this discussion aims to clarify how recognizing nonhuman rights independent from human interest lays a true foundation for human rights. Arguably, an ethical human-nonhuman relationship is a prerequisite for an ethical human-human relationship. To support this argument, I’ll start by drawing attention to epistemological processes within human-nonhuman abuse, and will continue by considering how violations of human rights by humans originate in human-nonhuman abuse in the context of contemporary war, including terrorism. If reflecting upon how we relate to others is constitutive of human rights work, then understanding why we practice those relations, or thinking about the epistemological foundation of our selves, is critical. The dominant modern relationship between human self and other is shaped by an epistemology of hyperseparation. Modern paradigms of rationality and objectification have constructed others as radically other. We might note how common and standard are the critiques that expose modern technoscience, politics and economics as socially powerful and potentially selfish agents that may act to disengage from, marginalise, exclude and control that which gets otherized.17 There is nothing unfamiliar about humans regarding themselves as exceptional and superior to the ‘other’. History is a chronicle of human mistreatment of the ‘other’ predominantly identified as nonhuman nature: the human/nature dualism appears in classical epistemology.18

#### The human/non-human divide is a prerequisite understanding to identity

Pugliese 2013 (Joseph, Associate Professor of Cultural Studies at Macquarie University. *State Violence and the Execution of Law: Biopolitcal Caesurae of Torture, Black Sites, Drones*. 2013; Law and the Postcolonial, AO)

In his *Lectures at the College de France,* Foucault examines the category of race in an in-depth manner that is strikingly absent from his previously published corpus. Race, indeed, assumes a fundamental role in his theorizing of biopolitics. In his analysis of early nineteenth-century European culture, Foucault identifies a decisive break with the past in relation to the uses and abuses of race and the 'discourse of race struggle': It [the discourse of race struggle] will become the discourse of a centered, centralized, and centralizing power. It will become the discourse of battle that has to be waged not between races, but by a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage. At this point, we have all those biological-racist discourses of degeneracy, but also all those institutions within the social body which make the discourse of race struggle function as a principle of exclusion and segregation and, ultimately, as a way of normalizing society.1\* Foucault identifies the resultant 'race wars' that this discourse of race struggle nables as what is 'articulated with European policies of colonization.'3 The biopolitics of race in the context of colonialism as theorized by Foucault is, in fact, nderpinned by a governing biopolitical category that remains at once unspoken and untheorized: speciesism - understood in all of its anthropocentric dimensions. The entire apparatus of the biopolitics of race - its colonial and imperial dimen­sions' its discriminatory, exclusionary and necropolitical effects - are, I propose, all rendered culturally intelligible and biopolitically enabled by the category of the absolute non-human other: the animal - and I deploy the problematic definite article here precisely in order to underscore the violent operations of homogeniza-tion, totalization and genericity that are operative in the binary logic of anthropo­centrism. The critical dependency of the biopolitics of racism on the category of non-human animals can be traced back to the 'prehistoricaP human enslavement ('domestication') of animals. The enslavement of animals must be seen as supplying the template for the consequent enslavement of humans as the fungibility of animals was historically transposed to human slaves - with, as I elaborate below, one critical intraspecies prohibition. Biopolitical arguments of race and 'the norm,' 'the biological heritage,' and the threats of 'degeneracy' are all premised, in the first instance, on the unspoken assumption of an anthropocentrism that has assiduously labored to construct and consolidate species hierarchies and their attendant knowledge/power effects in terms of the valuation, fungibility and governance of diverse life forms. If, as Foucault suggests, biopolitics was princi­pally 'focused on the species body,' then what remains unsaid in his work is the critical relation between the human species and its animal others. In his reflection on the manner in which the definite article designating 'the animal' has been wielded by Western philosophers throughout history, Jacques Derrida writes that: all philosophers have judged the limit to be single and indivisible, considering that on the other side of that limit there is an immense group, a single and fundamentally homogeneous set that one has the right, the theoretical or philosophical right, to distinguish and mark as opposite, namely, the set of the Animal in general, the Animal spoken of in the general singular. It applies to the whole animal kingdom with the exception of the human.'

#### Vote negative to endorse the global suicide of humanity

#### Our total rejection of human centered agency and the continuation of human life functions as a valuable thought experiment that allows us to break free from anthropocentric epistemology

Kochi and Ordan 08 – (Dec. 2008, Tarik Kochi, PhD, Lecturer in Law & International Security, University of Sussex, Noam Ordan, linguist and translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, research focus on human cultural history, “An argument for the global suicide of humanity,” Borderlands)

**How might such a standpoint of dialectical, utopian anti-humanism reconfigure a notion of action which does not simply repeat in another way the modern humanist infliction of violence, as exemplified by the plan of Hawking, or fall prey to institutional and systemic complicity in speciesist violence?** **While this question goes beyond what it is possible to outline in this paper, we contend that the thought experiment of global suicide helps to locate this question – the question of modern action itself – as residing at the heart of the modern environmental problem.** In a sense perhaps the only way to understand what is at stake in ethical action which responds to the natural environment is to come to terms with the logical consequences of ethical action itself**. The point operates then not as the end, but as the starting point of a standpoint which attempts to reconfigure our notions of action, life-value, and harm.**For some, guided by the pressure of moral conscience or by a **practice** of harm minimisation, the appropriate response to historical and contemporary environmental destruction is that of action guided by abstention. **For example, one way of reacting to mundane, everyday complicity is the attempt to abstain or opt-out of certain aspects of modern, industrial society: to not eat non-human animals, to invest ethically, to buy organic produce, to not use cars and buses, to live in an environmentally conscious commune.** Ranging from small personal decisions to the establishment of parallel economies (think of organic and fair trade products as an attempt to set up a quasi-parallel economy), a typical modern form of action is that of a refusal to be complicit in human practices that are violent and destructive. Again, however, at a practical level, to what extent are such acts of nonparticipation rendered banal by their complicity in other actions? **In a grand register of violence and harm the individual who abstains from eating non-human animals but still uses the bus or an airplane or electricity has only opted out of some harm causing practices and remains fully complicit with others. One response, however, which bypasses the problem of complicity and the banality of action is to take the non-participation solution to its most extreme level. In this instance, the only way to truly be non-complicit in the violence of the human heritage would be to opt-out altogether. Here, then, the modern discourse of reflection, responsibility and action runs to its logical conclusion – the global suicide of humanity – as a free-willed and ‘final solution’.** While we are not interested in the discussion of the ‘method’ of the global suicide of humanity per se, one method that would be the least violent is that of humans choosing to no longer reproduce. [10] **The case at point here is that the global suicide of humanity would be a moral act; it would take humanity out of the equation of life on this earth and remake the calculation for the benefit of everything nonhuman**. **While suicide in certain forms of religious thinking is normally condemned as something which is selfish and inflicts harm upon loved ones, the global suicide of humanity would be the highest act of altruism**. That is, global suicide would involve the taking of responsibility for the destructive actions of the human species. **By eradicating ourselves we end the long process of inflicting harm upon other species and offer a human-free world.** If there is a form of divine intelligence then surely the human act of global suicide will be seen for what it is: a profound moral gesture aimed at redeeming humanity. Such an act is an offer of sacrifice to pay for past wrongs that would usher in a new future. **Through the death of our species we will give the gift of life to others.** **It should be noted nonetheless that our proposal for the global suicide of humanity is based upon the notion that such a radical action needs to be voluntary and not forced. In this sense, and given the likelihood of such an action not being agreed upon, it operates as a thought experiment which may help humans to radically rethink what it means to participate in modern, moral life within the natural world. In other words, whether or not the act of global suicide takes place might well be irrelevant.** What is more important is the form of critical reflection that an individual needs to go through before coming to the conclusion that the global suicide of humanity is an action that would be worthwhile. The point then of a thought experiment that considers the argument for the global suicide of humanity is the attempt to outline an anti-humanist, or non-human-centric ethics. Such an ethics attempts to take into account both sides of the human heritage: the capacity to carry out violence and inflict harm and the capacity to use moral reflection and creative social organisation to minimise violence and harm**. Through the idea of global suicide such an ethics reintroduces a central question to the heart of moral reflection: To what extent is the value of the continuation of human life worth the total harm inflicted upon the life of all others?** Regardless of whether an individual finds the idea of global suicide abhorrent or ridiculous, this question remains valid and relevant and will not go

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#### Text: The President of the United States should rescind sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

#### Solves the aff

Hanley, 12

(James Hanley is an ISPU fellow and an Associate Professor and Department Chair of Political Science at Adrian College. “The Continuing Growth Of Executive Power: The National Defense Authorization Act of 2012” <http://www.ispu.org/pdfs/ISPU_Brief_NDAA_Bill_final.pdf>) Henge

1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate…. 2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain…. 3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter….27 In claiming the inherent executive authority to order detention, Bush was operating in that “zone of twilight”; however, because he relied on the AUMF he succeeded in moving his authority to “its maximum.” Since the Supreme Court accepted the claim of a congressional grant of authority, it did not need to examine the less certain claim of inherent executive power, the “lowest ebb” claim. Having the congressionally granted and judicially approved authority in hand, neither Bush nor his successor Barack Obama needed to reiterate the claim of inherent authority. Consequently, this claim remains unsettled because it has been neither confirmed nor rejected. It is not surprising that Bush, as its originator and a supporter of the unitary executive theory, never renounced it. But Obama, who criticized it as a candidate, has also not clearly rejected it as president. While publicly stating that he does base his detention authority on the AUMF, he has not taken the further step of stating that the president must rely on a congressional grant of authority.

### Case

#### Evaluate consequences

Jeffrey Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University-Bloomington, Dissent, Vol. 49 No. 2, Spring 2002

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness. WHAT WOULD IT mean for the American left right now to take seriously the centrality of means in politics? First, it would mean taking seriously the specific means employed by the September 11 attackers--terrorism. There is a tendency in some quarters of the left to assimilate the death and destruction of September 11 to more ordinary (and still deplorable) injustices of the world system--the starvation of children in Africa, or the repression of peasants in Mexico, or the continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. But this assimilation is only possible by ignoring the specific modalities of September 11. It is true that in Mexico, Palestine, and elsewhere, too many innocent people suffer, and that is wrong. It may even be true that the experience of suffering is equally terrible in each case. But neither the Mexican nor the Israeli government has ever hijacked civilian airliners and deliberately flown them into crowded office buildings in the middle of cities where innocent civilians work and live, with the intention of killing thousands of people. Al-Qaeda did precisely this. That does not make the other injustices unimportant. It simply makes them different. It makes the September 11 hijackings distinctive, in their defining and malevolent purpose--to kill people and to create terror and havoc. This was not an ordinary injustice. It was an extraordinary injustice. The premise of terrorism is the sheer superfluousness of human life. This premise is inconsistent with civilized living anywhere. It threatens people of every race and class, every ethnicity and religion. Because it threatens everyone, and threatens values central to any decent conception of a good society, it must be fought. And it must be fought in a way commensurate with its malevolence. Ordinary injustice can be remedied. Terrorism can only be stopped. Second, it would mean frankly acknowledging something well understood, often too eagerly embraced, by the twentieth century Marxist left--that it is often politically necessary to employ morally troubling means in the name of morally valid ends. A just or even a better society can only be realized in and through political practice; in our complex and bloody world, it will sometimes be necessary to respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won't work. In such situations our choice is not between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It is between the wrong that confronts us and the means--perhaps the dangerous means--we have to employ in order to oppose it. In such situations there is a danger that "realism" can become a rationale for the Machiavellian worship of power. But equally great is the danger of a righteousness that translates, in effect, into a refusal to act in the face of wrong. What is one to do? Proceed with caution. Avoid casting oneself as the incarnation of pure goodness locked in a Manichean struggle with evil. Be wary of violence. Look for alternative means when they are available, and support the development of such means when they are not. And never sacrifice democratic freedoms and open debate. Above all, ask the hard questions about the situation at hand, the means available, and the likely effectiveness of different strategies. Most striking about the campus left's response to September 11 was its refusal to ask these questions. Its appeals to "international law" were naive. It exaggerated the likely negative consequences of a military response, but failed to consider the consequences of failing to act decisively against terrorism. In the best of all imaginable worlds, it might be possible to defeat al-Qaeda without using force and without dealing with corrupt regimes and political forces like the Northern Alliance. But in this world it is not possible. And this, alas, is the only world that exists. To be politically responsible is to engage this world and to consider the choices that it presents. To refuse to do this is to evade responsibility. Such a stance may indicate a sincere refusal of unsavory choices. But it should never be mistaken for a serious political commitment.

#### Util is the only moral framework

Nye, 86 (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 18-19)

The significance and the limits of the two broad traditions can be captured by contemplating a hypothetical case.34 Imagine that you are visiting a Central American country and you happen upon a village square where an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants lined up against a wall. When you ask the reason, you are told someone in this village shot at the captain's men last night. When you object to the killing of possibly innocent people, you are told that civil wars do not permit moral niceties. Just to prove the point that we all have dirty hands in such situations, the captain hands you a rifle and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other. Otherwise both die. He warns you not to try any tricks because his men have their guns trained on you. Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity by refusing to play his dirty game? The point of the story is to show the value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden? Would it matter if there were twenty or 1,000 peasants to be saved? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons from a terrorists' nuclear device? At some point does not integrity become the ultimate egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity of the self is more important than the lives of countless others? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences? Do absolutist approaches to integrity become self-contradictory in a world of nuclear weapons? "Do what is right though the world should perish" was a difficult principle even when Kant expounded it in the eighteenth century, and there is some evidence that he did not mean it to be taken literally even then. Now that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.

#### Extinction outweighs everything

Bostrum 12 (Nick, Professor of Philosophy at Oxford, directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute and winner of the Gannon Award, Interview with Ross Andersen, correspondent at The Atlantic, 3/6, “We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction”, <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/>)

Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that human extinction risks are poorly understood and, worse still, severely underestimated by society. Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century. Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them. Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering. Can you explain why? Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.

#### Heg solves global nuclear war—multiple hotspots

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, 13 [Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is a Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is a Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, January 2013, Lean Forward In Defense of American Engagement, [http://www.twc.edu/sites/default/files/assets/academicCourseDocs/22.%20Brooks,%20Lean%20Forward.pdf](http://www.twc.edu/sites/default/files/assets/academicCourseDocs/22.%20Brooks%2C%20Lean%20Forward.pdf), B. Morales]

¶ They are wrong. In making their case, advocates of retrenchment overstate the costs of the current grand strategy and understate its benefits. In fact, the budgetary savings of lowering the United States' international profile are debatable, and there is little evidence to suggest that an internationally engaged America provokes other countries to balance against it, becomes overextended, or gets dragged into unnecessary wars.¶ The benefits of deep engagement, on the other hand, are legion. U.S. security commitments reduce competition in key regions and act as a check against potential rivals. They help maintain an open world economy and give Washington leverage in economic negotiations. And they make it easier for the United States to secure cooperation for combating a wide range of global threats. Were the United States to cede its global leadership role, it would forgo these proven upsides while exposing itself to the unprecedented downsides of a world in which the country was less secure, prosperous, and influential.¶ AN AFFORDABLE STRATEGY¶ Many advocates of retrenchment consider the United States' assertive global posture simply too expensive. The international relations scholar Christopher Layne, for example, has warned of the country's "ballooning budget deficits" and argued that "its strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them." Calculating the savings of switching grand strategies, however, is not so simple, because it depends on the expenditures the current strategy demands and the amount required for its replacement -- numbers that are hard to pin down.¶ If the United States revoked all its security guarantees, brought home all its troops, shrank every branch of the military, and slashed its nuclear arsenal, it would save around $900 billion over ten years, according to Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan of the Cato Institute. But few advocates of retrenchment endorse such a radical reduction; instead, most call for "restraint," an "offshore balancing" strategy, or an "over the horizon" military posture. The savings these approaches would yield are less clear, since they depend on which security commitments Washington would abandon outright and how much it would cost to keep the remaining ones. If retrenchment simply meant shipping foreign-based U.S. forces back to the United States, then the savings would be modest at best, since the countries hosting U.S. forces usually cover a large portion of the basing costs. And if it meant maintaining a major expeditionary capacity, then any savings would again be small, since the Pentagon would still have to pay for the expensive weaponry and equipment required for projecting power abroad.¶ The other side of the cost equation, the price of continued engagement, is also in flux. Although the fat defense budgets of the past decade make an easy target for advocates of retrenchment, such high levels of spending aren't needed to maintain an engaged global posture. Spending skyrocketed after 9/11, but it has already begun to fall back to earth as the United States winds down its two costly wars and trims its base level of nonwar spending. As of the fall of 2012, the Defense Department was planning for cuts of just under $500 billion over the next five years, which it maintains will not compromise national security. These reductions would lower military spending to a little less than¶ ¶ three percent of GDP by 2017, from its current level of 4.5 percent. The Pentagon could save even more with no ill effects by reforming its procurement practices and compensation policies.¶ Even without major budget cuts, however, the country can afford the costs of its ambitious grand strategy. The significant increases in military spending proposed by Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate, during the 2012 presidential campaign would still have kept military spending below its current share of GDP, since spending on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would still have gone down and Romney's proposed nonwar spending levels would not have kept pace with economic growth. Small wonder, then, that the case for pulling back rests more on the nonmonetary costs that the current strategy supposedly incurs.¶ UNBALANCED¶ One such alleged cost of the current grand strategy is that, in the words of the political scientist Barry Posen, it "prompts states to balance against U.S. power however they can." Yet there is no evidence that countries have banded together in anti-American alliances or tried to match the United States' military capacity on their own -- or that they will do so in the future.¶ Indeed, it's hard to see how the current grand strategy could generate true counterbalancing. Unlike past hegemons, the United States is geographically isolated, which means that it is far less threatening to other major states and that it¶ faces no contiguous great-power rivals that could step up to the task of balancing against it. Moreover, any competitor would have a hard time matching the U.S. military. Not only is the United States so far ahead militarily in both quantitative and qualitative terms, but its security guarantees also give it the leverage to prevent allies from giving military technology to potential U.S. rivals. Because the United States dominates the high-end defense industry, it can trade access to its defense market for allies' agreement not to transfer key military technologies to its competitors. The embargo that the United States has convinced the EU to maintain on military sales to China since 1989 is a case in point.¶ If U.S. global leadership were prompting balancing, then one would expect actual examples of pushback -- especially during the administration of George W. Bush, who pursued a foreign policy that seemed particularly unilateral. Yet since the Soviet Union collapsed, no major powers have tried to balance against the United States by seeking to match its military might or by assembling a formidable alliance; the prospect is simply too daunting. Instead, they have resorted to what scholars call "soft balancing," using international institutions and norms to constrain Washington. Setting aside the fact that soft balancing is a slippery concept and difficult to distinguish from everyday diplomatic competition, it is wrong to say that the practice only harms the United States. Arguably, as the global leader, the United States benefits from employing soft-balancing-style leverage more than any other country. After all, today's rules and institutions came about under its auspices and largely reflect its interests, and so they are in fact tailor-made for soft balancing by the United States itself. In 2011, for example, Washington coordinated action with several Southeast Asian states to oppose Beijing's claims in the South China Sea by pointing to established international law and norms.¶ Another argument for retrenchment holds that the United States will fall prey to the same fate as past hegemons and accelerate its own decline. In order to keep its ambitious strategy in place, the logic goes, the country will have to divert resources away from more productive purposes -- infrastructure, education, scientific research, and so on -- that are necessary to keep its economy competitive. Allies, meanwhile, can get away with lower military expenditures¶ ¶ and grow faster than they otherwise would.¶ The historical evidence for this phenomenon is thin; for the most part, past superpowers lost their leadership not because they pursued hegemony but because other major powers balanced against them -- a prospect that is not in the cards today. (If anything, leading states can use their position to stave off their decline.) A bigger problem with the warnings against "imperial overstretch" is that there is no reason to believe that the pursuit of global leadership saps economic growth. Instead, most studies by economists find no clear relationship between military expenditures and economic decline.¶ To be sure, if the United States were a dramatic outlier and spent around a quarter of its GDP on defense, as the Soviet Union did in its last decades, its growth and competitiveness would suffer. But in 2012, even as it fought a war in Afghanistan and conducted counterterrorism operations around the globe, Washington spent just 4.5 percent of GDP on defense -- a relatively small fraction, historically speaking. (From 1950 to 1990, that figure averaged 7.6 percent.) Recent economic difficulties might prompt Washington to reevaluate its defense budgets and international¶ commitments, but that does not mean that those policies caused the downturn. And any money freed up from dropping global commitments would not necessarily be spent in ways that would help the U.S. economy.¶ Likewise, U.S. allies' economic growth rates have nothing to do with any security subsidies they receive from Washington. The contention that lower military expenditures facilitated the rise of Japan, West Germany, and other countries dependent on U.S. defense guarantees may have seemed plausible during the last bout of declinist anxiety, in the 1980s. But these states eventually stopped climbing up the global economic ranks as their per capita wealth approached U.S. levels -- just as standard models of economic growth would predict. Over the past 20 years, the United States has maintained its lead in per capita GDP over its European allies and Japan, even as those countries' defense efforts have fallen further behind. Their failure to modernize their militaries has only served to entrench the United States' dominance.¶ LED NOT INTO TEMPTATION¶ The costs of U.S. foreign policy that matter most, of course, are human lives, and critics of an expansive grand strategy worry that the United States might get dragged into unnecessary wars. Securing smaller allies, they argue, emboldens those states to take risks they would not otherwise accept, pulling the superpower sponsor into costly conflicts -- a classic moral hazard problem. Concerned about the reputational costs of failing to honor the country's alliance commitments, U.S. leaders might go to war even when no national interests are at stake.¶ History shows, however, that great powers anticipate the danger of entrapment and structure their agreements to protect themselves from it. It is nearly impossible to find a clear case of a smaller power luring a reluctant great power into war. For decades, World War I served as the canonical example of entangling alliances supposedly drawing great powers into a fight, but an outpouring of new historical research has overturned the conventional wisdom, revealing that the war was more the result of a conscious decision on Germany's part to try to dominate Europe than a case of alliance entrapment.¶ If anything, alliances reduce the risk of getting pulled into a conflict. In East Asia, the regional security agreements that Washington struck after World War II were designed, in the words of the political scientist Victor Cha, to "constrain anticommunist allies in the region that might engage in aggressive behavior against adversaries that could entrap the United States in an unwanted larger war." The same logic is now at play in the U.S.-Taiwanese relationship.¶ ¶ After cross-strait tensions flared in the 1990s and the first decade of this century, U.S. officials grew concerned that their ambiguous support for Taiwan might expose them to the risk of entrapment. So the Bush administration adjusted its policy, clarifying that its goal was to not only deter China from an unprovoked attack but also deter Taiwan from unilateral moves toward independence.¶ For many advocates of retrenchment, the problem is that the mere possession of globe-girdling military capabilities supposedly inflates policymakers' conception of the national interest, so much so that every foreign problem begins to look like America's to solve. Critics also argue that the country's military superiority causes it to seek total solutions to security problems, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, that could be dealt with in less costly ways. Only a country that possessed such awesome military power and faced no serious geopolitical rival would fail to be satisfied with partial fixes, such as containment, and instead embark on wild schemes of democracy building, the argument goes.¶ Furthermore, they contend, the United States' outsized military creates a sense of obligation to do something with it even when no U.S. interests are at stake. As Madeleine Albright, then the U.S. ambassador to the un, famously asked Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when debating intervention in Bosnia in 1993, "What's the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if we can't use it?"¶ If the U.S. military scrapped its forces and shuttered its bases, then the country would no doubt eliminate the risk of entering needless wars, having tied itself to the mast like Ulysses. But if it instead merely moved its forces over the horizon, as is more commonly proposed by advocates of retrenchment, whatever temptations there were to intervene would not disappear. The bigger problem with the idea that a forward posture distorts conceptions of the national interest, however, is that it rests on just one case: Iraq. That war is an outlier in terms of both its high costs (it accounts for some two-thirds of the casualties and budget costs of all U.S. wars since 1990) and the degree to which the United States shouldered them alone. In the Persian Gulf War and the interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, U.S. allies bore more of the burden, controlling for the size of their economies and populations.¶ Besides, the Iraq war was not an inevitable consequence of pursuing the United States' existing grand strategy; many scholars and policymakers who prefer an engaged America strongly opposed the war. Likewise, continuing the current grand strategy in no way condemns the United States to more wars like it. Consider how the country, after it lost in Vietnam, waged the rest of the Cold War with proxies and highly limited interventions. Iraq has generated a similar reluctance to undertake large expeditionary operations -- what the political scientist John Mueller has dubbed "the¶ Iraq syndrome." Those contending that the United States' grand strategy ineluctably leads the country into temptation need to present much more evidence before their case can be convincing.¶ KEEPING THE PEACE¶ Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states.¶ Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal¶ ¶ their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier.¶ But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington -- notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia -- might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas.¶ There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers.¶ Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East -- but at what¶ cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow.¶ Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up.

#### The affirmative’s cry against the evils of the West portrays actions of the past as the root of all evil. This form of guilt-driven politics creates an infinite debt that must be relentlessly atoned for

Bruckner 1986

(Pascal, maître de conférences at the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, and collaborator at the Nouvel Observateur, “Tears of the White Man – Compassion as Contempt”, Ch.1 Page 3 & 4) MattG

Innocence corrupted by science, good misled by evil—both themes of this turn-of-the-century pot-boiler, a mixture of melo­drama and social fantasy, are still prominent today. Interestingly, they predominate not in literature, but in politics, particularly in relations between the Northern and Southern hemispheres. In al­most identical language, the callow Third World is described as having been robbed of its natural goodness by a diabolical and corrupting West. In fact, every Westerner is presumed guilty until proven innocent. We Europeans have been raised to detest ourselves, certain that, within our world, there is a certain essential evil that must be relentlessly atoned for. This evil is known by two terms-colonialism and imperialism. And it can be summed up in a few figures—tens of millions of Indians wiped out by the conquistadores, two hundred million Africans deported or dead in the slave trade, and the millions of Asians, Arabs, and Africans killed during colonial wars and wars of liberation-

#### The plan merely reverts oppression and dehumanizes anyone from America—this increases violence and turns the case

Bruckner 1986

(Pascal, maître de conférences at the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, and collaborator at the Nouvel Observateur, “Tears of the White Man – Compassion as Contempt”, Ch.1 Page 17) MattG

An expression invented by a famous American anti-war linguist to describe his country made a stir at this time: the Bloodbath Archipelago, as opposed to Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago.13 The United States unleashed unlimited resources for killing because of a profound internal moral putrefaction.14 There was no "American way of life," only an American way of death. This insane civilization was rapidly self-destructing before our eyes, and Rene" Dumont perceived a general failure throughout its inhuman supercities when he declared in 1973 that "New York had already become almost unlivable,"15 and was destined for a speedy ruin because of the combined effects of unemployment, garbage, and crime.

#### Persecution of Western ideals and hatred of the West allows brutes to rise to power. The impact is persecution, discrimination, torture, suppression, and ultimately, death.

Burma & Margalit 4 (Ian Buruma is writer for The New York Review of Books, The New Yorker, The New York Times. Currently Henry R. Luce Professor of Democracy, Human Rights, and Journalism at Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY. Avishai Margalit is the George F. Kennan Professor at the Institue for Advanced Study in Princeton, and Professor Emeritus in Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. OCCIDENTALISM: THE WEST IN THE EYES OF ITS ENEMIES. ISBN: 0-14-303487-1, pg. 41-42)IAA

The horizon of Mao’s rural revolution went far beyond Shanghai. His idea of a rural revolt was not limited to China. Mao saw himself as the champion of the entire Third World. And so did his sympathizers of the West. For all those who hated the Bourgeois West, Maoism promised a way out of capitalist alienation, urban decadence, Western imperialism, selfish individualism, cold reason, and modern anomie. Under Mao, warm human bonds would be restored, life would have deep meaning once again, and people would have faith. The Country would finally strike back, just as God once had his revenge on Babylon, and as a new generation of holy warriors is attempting to do today. Mao’s most immediate target was the “Westernized” city dwelling bourgeoisie. In the autumn of 1951, he unleashed a succession of bloody campaigns against bourgeois capitalists and intellectuals. “Tiger-hunting teams” were sent out to gather likely suspects for public humiliation, torture, and, for several hundred thousand people, death. Intellectuals, Mao declared, had to be cleansed of bourgeois ideology, especially individualism and pro-Americanism. Small fry would be sent to hard labor camps, but the worst offenders were immediately shot. The assault on the urban middle class went on for more than a decade. A speech Mao gave to Party leaders in 1955 is couched in the brutal rhetoric of Marxism-Leninism, but it shares a common loathing with other revolutionaries who would bring the pillars of the City down: On this matter, we are quite heartless! On this matter, Marxism is indeed cruel and has little mercy, for it is determined to exterminate imperialism, feudalism, capitalism, and small production to boot….Some of our comrades are too kind, they are not tough enough, in other words, they are not so Marxist. It is a very good thing, and a significant one too, to exterminate the bourgeoisie and capitalism in China. Our aim is to exterminate capitalism, obliterate it from the face of the earth and make it a thing of the past.15

#### Their criticism of America is merely a displacement of their own guilt and anger over their own weakness—this proliferates amongst liberals and manifests itself in hatred.

Bruckner 1986

(Pascal, maître de conférences at the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, and collaborator at the Nouvel Observateur, “Tears of the White Man – Compassion as Contempt”, Ch.1 Page 16) MattG

Western Europe knew that, without the help of the Marines, they would purely and simply have been wiped off the map. But some forms of generosity are insulting. Because salvation came from the outside— except for some weak internal resistance whose effect was more symbolic than military (De Gaulle's genius was to purge France of the dishonor of collaboration)— America showed very clearly the life force that had once been alive in Europe. The little American cousin had surpassed her European elders in vigor, power, and creativity. It is hard to forgive assistance when it shows up such weakness. And so, the liberator of 1944 became the enemy of mankind. From then on, every occasion was sought to get back at the USA, at least symbolically. The Cold War, McCarthyism, and then the Korean War were to constitute the first occasions for an outpouring of bitterness. For a degenerate Europe that had watched rather than participated in history, however, there was a particularly sweet revenge to be taken on a New World that was still trying to teach it something when the first units of the American expeditionary forces landed in Saigon in 1965. The old whore, poor and needy, scolded the young prostitute for her wrongdoing, in order to expunge her own earlier misdeeds. On the morrow of the Algerian War and its bloody excesses, what a pleasure it was for the French to unload the colonial burden on Uncle Sam, who, as it happened, had shown a remarkable hypocrisy. Nobody in Paris had forgotten that the Eisenhower administration had refused to help the defeated French army at Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954. Upon our transatlantic cousin, who pillaged Central America, re-established dictatorship in Santo Domingo, showered fire and napalm on Viet-cong guerrillas, organized the blocade of Cuba, and overthrew the socialist regime of Allende, we could vomit forth accusations of what we ourselves once were the inheritors of a colonial culture and we could be repulsed by an image that horrified us. Faced with rejection from the four corners of the world, in the face of European traditions of culture and refinement America the Evil was showing all the symptoms by which the guilt of the West was known—she was rich to the point of satiety; imperialistic, domineering, insolent, and polluting; alienating her youth; exploiting her minorities; glorifying her foundation on genocide; a prospering only because of massacre and murder. She was a nation that had replaced the good things in life with the pursuit of profit, and moral values with the cult of the almighty dollar. In a word, she was the very apotheosis of rapacity and violence.

## 2NC—Case

### Shift

#### Restrictions on indefinite detention empirically lead to a massive increase in drone use.

Crandall 2013 (Carla Crandall, J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. If You Can¶ 't Beat Them, Kill Them: Complex¶ Adaptive Systems Theory and the Rise in Targeted¶ Killing Seton Hall Law Review¶ Volume 43 | Issue 2 Article 3¶ 4-19-2013¶ ¶ <http://erepository.law.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1466&context=shlr>, bs)

Given this recent expansion, drone warfare largely has been ¶ associated with President Obama. Indeed, as one reporter explained, ¶ “no president has ever relied so extensively on the secret killing of ¶ individuals to advance the nation’s security goals.”221 Yet, while it is ¶ certainly true that targeted killing via drones has increased ¶ significantly under the Obama Administration,222 the escalation ¶ actually began in the summer of 2008 when—just one month after the ¶ Boumediene decision—President Bush issued an “order that ¶ dramatically expanded the scope of Predator drone strikes against ¶ militants . . . .”223 During the remainder of 2008, the number of ¶ drone attacks conducted in Pakistan alone “vastly exceed[ed] the ¶ number of strikes over the prior four years combined.”224¶ ¶ As noted, this escalation has continued under the Obama ¶ Administration. Reports indicate, for instance, that between 2009 ¶ and 2010, the number of drone strikes in Pakistan more than ¶ doubled—from 54 in 2009, to 122 in 2010.225 Although this number ¶ has since been in decline (73 such attacks took place in 2011, while ¶ 48 occurred in 2012), the current rate still significantly outpaces that seen pre-Boumediene.¶ 226 Beyond this quantitative increase in drone use ¶ during President Obama’s tenure, there has also been an equally ¶ important qualitative expansion. In 2011, the Wall Street Journal ¶ reported that “[t]he U.S. military is deploying a new force of armed ¶ drones to eastern Africa in an escalation of its campaign to strike ¶ militant targets in the region and expand intelligence on ¶ extremists.”227 This new arsenal is expected to support the recent ¶ trend of expanding the geographic scope of drone warfare farther ¶ away from America’s ground wars.228 More strikingly, in September of ¶ 2011, government officials confirmed that a Hellfire missile launched ¶ from a CIA drone killed Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen.229 While news of a ¶ targeted killing carried out in Yemen might have been noteworthy in ¶ itself, 230 even more remarkable was the fact that al-Awlaki was a U.S. ¶ citizen.231 The strike was thus evidence of another expansion in ¶ drone warfare, permitting attacks even against Americans who, ¶ though alleged to have been involved in terrorists operations, had ¶ not been afforded traditional due process protections.232¶ ¶ To be sure, there are a number of possible explanations for this ¶ expanded use of drones to carry out targeted killings. First, in recent ¶ years, drones undoubtedly have become more sophisticated in terms ¶ of their capabilities. This is especially true as pertaining to their ¶ payload capacity and target recognition features.233 The burgeoning use of drones also may have been triggered by the withdrawal of ¶ ground troops from areas where targeted killing has more recently ¶ been pursued.234 In that vein, some have intimated that the rise in ¶ drone use is a factor of the growing hesitancy to place American ¶ troops in harm’s way on a battlefield.235 Finally, some have suggested ¶ that drone use is more prevalent now because, as a tactical strategy, ¶ targeted killing is simply more effective in the asymmetrical, global ¶ war on terror.236 ¶ While these explanations are certainly plausible, even granting ¶ that these factors have contributed to the rise in drone use does not ¶ exclude the possibility that the strategy actually constitutes a form of ¶ self-organization emerging from the complex properties inherent ¶ within the systems of law and war. Indeed, while not using this ¶ language, many commentators are beginning to acknowledge the ¶ correlation between the expanded use of drones and the fact that the ¶ executive no longer has a comprehensive detention strategy.237 As ¶ one senior military official has stated, “[w]hen you don’t have a ¶ detention policy,” operational tactics have to change.238 Indeed, the ¶ fact is that since the Supreme Court decided Boumediene in 2008, ¶ there have been few reports of the United States capturing high-value ¶ targets.239 This reality may well indicate that efforts to grant detainees ¶ more rights have instead instigated an unforeseen and unintended ¶ shift away from capture and toward targeted killing.

#### Soft power is key to heg

Sankar Sen 5 is Former Director of Indian National Police Academy, The Statesman, 4-5-5, L/N

Indeed anti-American sentiment is sweeping the world after the Iraq war. It has, of course, been aggravated by the aggressive style of the present American President. Under George Bush, anti-Americanism is widely thought to have reached new heights. In the coming years the USA will lose more of its ability to lead others if it decides to act unilaterally. If other states step aside and question the USA's policies and objectives and seek to de-legitimise them, the problems of the USA will increase manifold. American success will lie in melding power and cooperation and generating a belief in other countries that their interests will be served by working with instead of opposing the United States. It is aptly said that use of power without cooperation becomes dictatorial and breeds resistance and resentment. But cooperation without power produces posturing and no concrete progress. There is also another disquieting development. It seems American soft power is waning and it is losing its allure as a model society. Much of the rest of the world is no longer looking up to the USA as a beacon. Rising religiosity, rank hostility to the UN, Bush's doctrine of preventive war, Guantanamo Bay etc are creating disquiet in the minds of many and turning them off America. This diminution of America's soft power will also create disenchantment and may gradually affect American pre-eminence.

#### Heg key to stability—transition causes war

Zhang and Shi 11 [Yuhan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Lin Shi, Columbia University, “America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry,” [**http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry**](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry), January 22, 2011, SSanchez]

Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

#### Heg key to prevent arms races, miscalc, competitors and new threats

Khalilzad 11 [Zahlmay was the [United States Ambassador to the United Nations](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Ambassador_to_the_United_Nations) under President [George W. Bush](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_W._Bush). He has been involved with [U.S. policy makers](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_the_United_States) at the [White House](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_House),[State Department](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_Department%22%20%5Co%20%22State%20Department) and [Pentagon](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Pentagon) since the mid-1980s. <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad?page=2>, SSanchez]

American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.

### Flex

#### Checks on the executive prevent effective responses to nuke terror and prolif

Li 2009 (ZHEYAO LI, J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, 2009; B.A., political science and history, Yale University, Winter, 2009¶ The Georgetown Journal of Law Public Policy¶ 7 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 373, lexis, bs)

Another tenet of the Congressionalist position is "balanced institutional participation in foreign affairs." n25 Professor Koh, for example, advocates the implementation of a national security charter to reflect what he sees as the needed restoration of the separation and balance of powers between all three branches of government. This charter would be "[c]onsistent with the guiding principle of balanced institutional participation," prescribing a foreign affairs decision-making apparatus in which all three branches play important roles: "in a Congress that enacts a framework statute defining institutional responsibilities in foreign affairs; in a president who helps draft and apply the statute; and in courts who construe the charter and draw boundaries between lawful and unlawful conduct." n26 One of the most troubling features of Professor Koh's proposal is the involvement of the judicial branch.¶ Professor Koh fails to adequately discuss the objection that judicial intervention in the formulation of foreign policy would constitute an inherently political act. For, indeed, as Carl von Clausewitz once wrote, "[w]ar is merely the continuation of policy by other means" and "[w]hen whole communities go to war--whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples--the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object." n27 Thus, to call for judicial review of the constitutionality or even [\*380] statutory legality of war actions is to invite judicial second-guessing in the policymaking motivations and processes of the political branches, and to weigh the wisdom of the legislature against the wisdom of the executive. A federal district court in Massachusetts was conscious of this exact problem when confronted, in a suit filed by six members of Congress, with the issue of whether President George W. Bush legally used force in committing troops to Iraq in 2003. The court ruled that, "[a]bsent a clear abdication of this constitutional responsibility by the political branches, the judiciary has no role to play." n28 The district court's holding was subsequently affirmed by the First Circuit on appeal, and the plaintiffs refrained from petitioning the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. n29¶ Another shortcoming of Professor Koh's proposal to introduce new institutional checks and balances on the war powers through statutory enactment is revealed when he quotes, but quickly dismisses, the concerns of Professor Paul Kennedy, who wrote even before the end of the Cold War that the United States¶ "may not always be assisted by its division of constitutional and decision-making powers, deliberately created when it was geographically and strategically isolated from the rest of the world two centuries ago . . . but which may be harder to operate when it has become a global superpower, often called upon to make swift decisions vis-a-vis countries which enjoy far fewer constraints." n30¶ While Koh is absolutely correct when he argues that, simply because other nation-states might not abide by the same constitutional or democratic constraints, that does not entitle America to freely disregard her own Constitution, n31 this tautology does not provide a satisfactory conclusion to the inquiry, especially when American lives are at stake.¶ Specifically, Professor Koh fails to foresee the unique problems presented by the rise of non-state actors, particularly terrorist groups. He writes that "[e]xpecting, perhaps, a response to a nuclear strike, the occasions are exceedingly rare when the president would jeopardize the nation by considering legality before committing the nation to a course of international action." n32 This statement is true when considered solely in the context of non-nuclear, state-based threats. In the modern age of international terrorism and rogue states, however, considering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the ease and low cost with which WMDs may be deployed, the President may not have the luxury to [\*381] wait on congressional debate and approval before acting to prevent the loss of American lives.

#### Nuke terror causes extinction

Ayson ‘10 Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2010, informaworld

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. t may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

#### Prolif causes extinction

Kroenig ’12 Matthew Kroenig, Council on Foreign Relations Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow and Georgetown University assistant professor of government, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 5/26/2012, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&tid=30

Should we worry about the spread of nuclear weapons? At first glance, this might appear to be an absurd question. After all, nuclear weapons are the most powerful weapons ever created by man. A single nuclear weapon could vaporize large portions of a major metropolitan area, killing millions of people, and a full-scale nuclear war between superpowers could end life on Earth as we know it. For decades during the Cold War, the public feared nuclear war and post-apocalyptic nuclear war scenarios became a subject of fascination and terror in popular culture. Meanwhile, scholars carefully theorized the dangers of nuclear weapons and policymakers made nuclear nonproliferation a top national priority. To this day, the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries remains a foremost concern of U.S. leaders. Indeed, in his 2012 annual threat assessment to the U.S. Congress, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper argued that nuclear proliferation poses one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security.[1] Recently, however, academics have become more vocal in questioning the threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. Students of international politics known as “proliferation optimists” argue that the spread of nuclear weapons might actually be beneficial because it deters great power war and results in greater levels of international instability.[2] Other scholars, whom I label “proliferation anti-obsessionists,” maintain that nuclear proliferation is neither good nor bad, but irrelevant.[3] They claim that nuclear weapons do not have any meaningful effect on international politics and that the past seventy years of world history would have been roughly the same had nuclear weapons never been invented. Some take this line of argument even further and argue that the only real problem is not the nuclear weapons themselves, but great power nonproliferation policy.[4] They argue that the cure that countries like the United States implement in order to prevent other states from acquiring nuclear weapons is much worse than the disease of the spread of nuclear weapons itself. While these arguments remain provocative, they are far from new. The idea that a few nuclear weapons are sufficient to deter a larger adversary and keep the peace has its origins in the early strategic thinking of the 1940s. Moreover, a critical review of this literature demonstrates that many of these arguments are much less sound than they initially appear. Indeed, both proliferation optimism and proliferation anti-obsessionism rest on internal logical contradictions. In this essay, I argue that the spread of nuclear weapons poses a grave threat to international peace and to U.S. national security. Scholars can grab attention by making counterintuitive arguments about nuclear weapons being less threatening than power holders believe them to be, but their provocative claims cannot wish away the very real dangers posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. The more states that possess nuclear weapons, the more likely we are to suffer a number of devastating consequences including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained U.S. freedom of action, weakened alliances, and the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. While it is important not to exaggerate these threats, it would be an even greater sin to underestimate them and, as a result, not take the steps necessary to combat the spread of the world’s most dangerous weapons.

### 2NC—Prolif O/W

#### Highest magnitude—no checks on escalation

Taylor 1 (Theodore, Chairman of NOVA, Former Nuclear Weapons Designer, 2001, http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/chapters/taylor.html)

Nuclear proliferation - be it among nations or terrorists - greatly increases the chance of nuclear violence on a scale that would be intolerable. Proliferation increases the chance that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of irrational people, either suicidal or with no concern for the fate of the world. Irrational or outright psychotic leaders of military factions or terrorist groups might decide to use a few nuclear weapons under their control to stimulate a global nuclear war, as an act of vengeance against humanity as a whole. Countless scenarios of this type can be constructed. Limited nuclear wars between countries with small numbers of nuclear weapons could escalate into major nuclear wars between superpowers. For example, a nation in an advanced stage of "latent proliferation," finding itself losing a nonnuclear war, might complete the transition to deliverable nuclear weapons and, in desperation, use them. If that should happen in a region, such as the Middle East, where major superpower interests are at stake, the small nuclear war could easily escalate into a global nuclear war.

## 1NR—Case

### Kayse – 1NR

#### Blaming the US for violence committed by others permits totalitarian governments and violent radicals to commit atrocities—only to have thoseatrocities blamed on the United States and require atonement in a vicious cycle of guilt.

Beer 1986

(William R., a professor of sociology at Brooklyn College, introduction to “Tears of the White Man: Compassion as Contempt”Page XIV of Intro,) MattG

Third-Worldism, then, is a sign of the intellectual sterility of the Left, which must seek abroad for people to liberate because class struggle and Marxian revolution are becoming increasingly irrelevant at home. The course of Third-Worldism in the United States has been quite different, and in its peculiarly American guise, remains politically influential. It also takes on some different forms. Still, in America, as in France, the downtrodden countries of the world are glorified, while the West is denigrated. Third-Worldists never criticize Soviet colonialism in Central Asia, Chinese Communist colonialism in Tibet, or Vietnamese colonialism in Cambodia. Third-Worldism is directed almost exclusively against capitalist democracies. Noam Chomsky, for example, one of the best-known American Third-Worldists, blames the United States for the numerous "bloodbaths'' that have occurred since World War II. Even when massacres and repression are the work of leftist totalitarians, Chomsky holds the United States responsible, because its lack of acceptance drives leftist totalitarians to their actions (cf. Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War, Pantheon, 1982, esp. pp. 22-29). William Shawcross, too, performs the intellectual acrobatics needed to achieve this posture. In Sideshow (Simon and Schuster, 1979), his famous book on Cambodia, Shaw-cross attempts to blame the United States for the holocaust perpetrated by the Khmers Rouges. He alleges that the Khmers Rouges arose from the "inferno" that was created by American policy. "Statesmen must be judged by the consequences of their actions. Whatever Nixon and Kissinger intended for Cambodia, their efforts created catastrophe. . . . Cambodia was not a mistake; it was a crime" (p. 396). Simply put, Shawcross's argument says that Communists commit genocide and America is responsible. Chomsky and Shawcross are only two among many who unfailingly conclude that American policy must be held accountable for the "excesses" of Third World revolutionaries.

#### Movements based upon identity-distinctions in humanity inevitably portrays victims as the Noble Savage and expels those outside of the movement and places guilt upon them – this increases targeted violence which turns the case

Beer 1986

(William R., a professor of sociology at Brooklyn College, introduction to “Tears of the White Man: Compassion as Contempt”Page xvi of Intro,) MattG

In *Racial Oppression in America* (Vintage, 1972), Robert Blauner expands the notion of the domestic Third World to in­clude not only blacks, but also Mexican-Americans, American In­dians, Chinese-Americans and Japanese-Americans. He argues that all these groups have been subjected to "forced, involuntary entry," see their culture destroyed or changed as a result of being in the United States, are subject to control by government bu­reaucracies ("outsiders who look down on them"), and are subject to racism. Serious analysis shows that the argument is deeply flawed, if only in that the economic problems of American Indians and some Mexican-Americans stand in stark contrast to the as­tounding success of Chinese- and Japanese-Americans. Black Americans were brought here involuntarily, while Mexican-Americans mainly migrated here by choice, as did Chinese and Japanese-Americans. If these groups collectively represent the do­mestic Third World, they are a category that is so heterogeneous as to be highly suspect. Blauner and Carmichael and Hamilton framed their positions to show that allegedly oppressed groups at home were part of the same struggle being waged against America and the West abroad. Though intellectually spurious, these positions enjoyed a certain popularity for a while, and with traumatic results. Carmichael gave a condensed version of his argument in his celebrated "Black Power" speech in 1965. As a result, white Americans who until then had lent substantial financial, legal, and personal support to the civil-rights struggle, were purged from the movement. Whites were part of the colonizing force that oppressed blacks; whites, by definition, could not be seen as part of the internal Third World, and had to be expelled.

#### Their revolution demands punishment and death for the West

Bruckner 1986

(Pascal, maître de conférences at the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, and collaborator at the Nouvel Observateur, “Tears of the White Man – Compassion as Contempt”, Ch.1 Page 18 and 19) MattG

The certainty that we were living in a decisive epoch balanced on the brink of a cataclysmic revolution that would cleanse the impure face of the universe reinforced the desire for punishments, misfortunes, and vengeance to be visited on the imperialist scum. Everything that could harm, weaken, and abase this figurehead of the white world was acclaimed—from the rebellions in ghettos and the Indian insurrections to the anti-war agitation of youth and Solidarity; or, The Bad Guys Against the Good Guys the disintegration of American Army morale. A frantic war dance commanded us to applaud the death of every GI, every news report of a Vietcong victory. Everywhere, and without letup, we encouraged the "political, military, economic, and moral" debacle described by Senator George McGovern in September 1971. And, finally, in the victory of General Giap's troops, we hailed the revenge of Sitting Bull against Buffalo Bill, of the Indian and the "nigger" against the bloodthirsty cowboy.

#### The affirmative frames their advocacy in “third-worldism” – in an attempt to rectify the cause of their guilt, they attempt to create solidarity with, pity for, and imitation of the people they try to help – this silences the voices of those very people and turns the case.

Beer 1986

(William R., a professor of sociology at Brooklyn College, introduction to “Tears of the White Man: Compassion as Contempt”Page XI of Intro,) MattG

Bruckner identifies three versions of Third-Worldism as it has flourished in Europe during the last two decades: solidarity with, pity for, and imitation of the Thirld World. The first stance is one of fellowship—that "their fight is our fight"; that the forces of oppression are the same around the world. We in advanced industrial countries are oppressed, too. The same forces that exploit the Burmese peasant oppress the middle-class housewife in Paris, homosexuals in Berlin, and factory workers in Lagos. This position holds that, every time a Communist guerrilla shoots a soldier in El Salvador, I am a little freer; every time Lesbians demonstrate for the right to adopt children, the herdsmen of the Sudan are a little freer. The pitying attitude holds that, because we are rich and they are poor, we are their oppressors. Being rich is tantamount to being guilty; being poor is proof of innocence. Further, our wealth is the cause of their poverty. Our consumer-oriented economies cause their suffering because our greed for microwave ovens and hair conditioners forces them to produce raw materials for our factories, rather than the products they need for themselves. Moreover, our tolerance and democracy are possible only because they are based on our wealth, which in turn is the cause of the suffering~~~~ of the poor. The price of our well-being and liberty is their misery and oppression. The third version of Third-Worldism holds that the people of the developing world have a wisdom that we have lost. Peasants and primitives are seen as somehow closer to nature and to one another then we are. The frippery and complexity of our modern societies contrast with the noble simplicity of their lives. To redeem ourselves as individuals, we must try to be like them; to redeem our societies, we must try to make them pre-modern, more organic. This involves pilgrimages—the word is Bruckner's and precisely appropriate—to somewhere in the Third World, where one picks up a little savvy, and perhaps a costume or artifact.